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Abstract: For a long time, the Tanzaniaji Fisheries Department has managed Tanzanian fisheries without incorporating
other stakeholders within its management framework. On Lake Victoria, the persistent use of illegal fishing geai- and
declining catches have led the government to realise that this system of fisheries management may no longer be viable,
and have sought to incorporate fishing communities into the management structure. Through the creation of Beach
Management Units (BMUs), the Fisheries Departments have sought to persuade fishing communities to implement and
enforce Tanzania's fishing regulations and to monitor the fishery.
In this paper we explore a recently gathered data set that yields information on, amongst others, how Tanzanian fishing
communities perceive the state of their resource base, how they view their relationship with the Fisheries Department,
the efficacy of fishing regulations and other variables, We draw on a series of criteria developed by Ostrom (1990) for
institutional 'robustness' to explore various areas of institutional development on Lake Victoria, and to try and
anticipate how the BM1Js will fare.
We argue that there are many socio-political and economic factors that will determine how communities will receive
and perceive their responsibilities towards government fishing regulations. Like other government-imposed
administrative structures at the local level, these will become 'sociahised' such that they will vary from place to place.
While this may bode well for problems of heterogeneity, it does not necessarily mean that fisheries management
objective on Lake Victoria will be met.
introduction
In Tanzania's Lake Victoria fishery in the early 1990s, nascent populations of the introduced Nile perch
exploded. Catches of the fish grew from 15 tonnes in 1978 to 103,481 in 1995 (Unpublished Fisheries
Division statistics). In 1992, responding to foreign market demand, industrial Nile perch filleting factories
were established in Mwanza and elsewhere along the lake shore.
Soaring demand and plentiful supplies prompted considerable effort increases in the Tanzanian sector of the
lake, and the number of boats in the fishery grew by 57 per cent, from 3,398 units in 1978, to 7,953 units in
1995 (Unpublished Fisheries Division statistics). Concomitant competition was intense, and as it grew, the
level of net and boat theft on the lake also increased. Some fishing communities attempted to involve local
vigilante groups (sungusungu), in an attempt to curb gear theft. Fish filleting factories were not unaffected
by these theft increases as many liad invested heavily in harvesting power, providing loans, equipment and
boats to fishers.
The use of illegal gear also increased for a number of reasons, including market forces, poverty, falling
incomes and corruption. The growing demand of the fish export markets encouraged local communities to
adopt illegal gear and to catch juveniles that liad ready markets both amongst fish filleting factories and
local communities. High demand also fuelled intense fishing pressure, which caused the quality of catches to
decline, and resulting in the intermittent closure of foreign markets to Tanzanian Lake Victoria fish.
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As a result of both increasing theft and grave concerns over the quality of fish landed, efforts to reform the
dominant, top-down managerial approach of the Tanzanian fisheries authorities were spearheaded by
industrial processing plants. The plants set about trying to develop a managerial system that would involve
the Fisheries Department and fisher-folk in a co-managerial arrangement.
Fisheries management has traditionally sought to ensure that fish populations are sustained for the benefit of
the fishing communities that rely on them or for the sake of biodiversity concerns. Many of the traditional
systems designed to obtain this objective have not worked (cf. Crean and Symes, 1996), with the result that
alternative management strategies have been considered. One of these is co-management.
Pomeroy, (1998:71) defined co-management as a partnership arrangement in which goverllnient agencies,
the community of local resource users (fishers), non-governmeiital organisations (NGOs), and other
stakeholders (fish traders, boat owners, business people) share responsibility and authority for the
management of a fishery. Pomeroy noted that multiple tasks might be managed under the co-management
arrangements at different stages in the management process. These may include adjusting and maturing to
changing conditions over time and involving aspects such as democratisatiori, social empowerment, power
sharing and deceittrahisation.
According to Ponieroy, co-management should be not be viewed as a single management strategy and there
is iìo single model of co-management. Co-management is not a regulatory technique but should be seen as a
flexible management structure in which actioii in participation, rule-making, conflict management, po'i--
sharing, leadership, dialogu, decision-making, knowledge generation and sharing, learning, and
development among resource users, and stakeholders arid government is provided and maintained (Pomeroy,
1998:72).
Co-management is often taken to be an arrangement in which fishing communities play an active and
possibly cloniinant role in the regulation of the fisheries that they exploit, in conjunction with the state
fisheries departments. Co-management may also include additional stakeholder groups, such as fish
processing factories, NGOs, community based organisations, fishers and fish traders, youth groups, co-
operative societies and other interested parties.
lii recent years, there have been signs of declines in the volume of Tanzania's Lake Victoriaii fish landings
(see MkLmmbo, 2000 amid Figure 1), and hence new management measures are necessary for the fishery. The
Tanzanian Fisheries Department is aware of co-management, amid has approached the restructuring of their
regulatory systems through the establishment, in 1999, of Beach Management Units (BM Us), community
elected committees who are mandated to implement amid enforce Tanzanian fisheries legislation. This
initiative is a far cry from Pomeroy's (1998) understamidimig of co-management in that it represents the
imposition of fisheries management measures by the state upon fishing communities, amid is by mio mea.. a
negotiated outcome.
This paper presents recently collected data on Tanzania's Lake Victoria fishery amici examines theseusimig
criteria for 'institutional robustness' as presented by Ostrom (1990). The paper cautions that although the
data miieet these criteria to greater or lesser degrees, it does not necessarily follow that convergence with the
criteria automatically translates imito the management of the fishery. The paper draws on recent experiences
within the fishery - particularly the creation of BMUs and the activities of suhlgusungli groups - to argue
this loint, and concludes that the failure to create horizontal managerial linkages, combined with a
devolution of managerial powers to local levels, may contribute to the imieffmciency of the BMUs lo combat
declining fish yields.
I IS
Fig. 1: Tanzanian catches from Lake Victoria, 1978-1 995
(Sources: Greboval and Fryd, 1994; Unpublished Fisheries Division statistics).
UNUe perch DTilapia Dagaa Haplo.s
The data on which this paper is based were collected between July and September 1999 from 28 fishing
communities along the Tanzanian coastline of Lake Victoria,' selected using a stratìfied sampling format. A
total of 334 structured interviews were administered to fishers directly involved in fish harvesting. This data
base is published in SEDAWOG, 2000a. Additional data is drawn from secondary sources, subsequent
Participatory Rural Appraisals (SEDAWOG, 2000b), and observations. The paper commences by discussing
fishers' perspectives on the state of their resource, and then goes on to discuss the remaining data
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reference to criteria for institutional 'robustness' (durability) laid down by Ostrom (1990).
Community perceptions of resource status and awareness of laws and regulations
There is a fairly high degree of unanimity amongst Tanzanian fishers over a series of indicators used to
gauge their impressions concerning the well-being of the resource base on which they rely (Table 1).
Generally, there was strong support for the view that there was less fish now in 1999 than there was in 1995
(84%), that fishing trips were longer because fishers had to go 'further to catch fish (8 1%), that fish diversity
had declined (82%) that the number of boats had increased during the period (65%) and that fishing incomes
had declined (77%). There were only small majorities for the notions that the average size of fish had
declined (54%) and that there was more illegal gear use in 1999 than there was in 1995 (54%: SEDAWOG
2000a).
'Mwisenge, Bwai, Kome and Nyarusulya (Musoma Rural District), Jua Kali and Kinesi (Tarime District), Kisorya and
Kibara (Bunda District), Malelema Island and Bugolala (Ukerewe District), Larnadi and Ihale (Magu District), Igombe
and Butuji (Mwanza Urban District), Choie and Mitego (Misungwi District), Buyagu and Chimfufu (Sengerema
District), Chelameno and Mchangani (Geita District), Kasagala and Malila (Biharamulo District), Lubiri Island and
Ruhanga (Muleba District), Nyamkazi and Kifungu (Bukoba Urban District), and Igabiro and Male (Bukoba Rural
District).
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Table 1: Res ondents' level of a:reement to statements concernin fisheries resource chanoe b taroet fish s ecies
(Percentages provided are out of response totals: source: SEDA WOG, 2000a).
Fishers were divided over the reasons for these resource declines. The largest proportion (31%) agreed that
it was because excessive effort levels, followed by those who attributed them to either water hyacinth
infestation2 or pollution (24%) and the disobedience of regulations (2 1%).
As for why the use of illegal fishing gear should have spread, 61% of Tanzanian fisher: d that no fish
would be caught unless small mesh-sizes were used, 61% said that small mesh-sizes were ch:aper than those
stipulated in the regulations, while 84% of respondents disaßreedthat illegal gear use had escalated because
of the Fisheries Department' s failure to enforce regulations.
The belief that the role of the state in Tanzania's Lake Victorian fisheries management is essentially a good
thing was reiterated elsewhere in questioning. 53% of respondents thsareedthat state regulations were 'no
good', 68% said that people obeyed these regulations, 57% of respondents characterised their relationship
with the Fisheries Department as 'good', and, finally, 61% disareedthat the Fisheries Department was not
doing well protecting fish stocks.
What the above figures suggest is that while Tanzanian fishers by and large agree that fundamental
deleterious trends have affected the fish stocks on which they rely, there is not necessarily a causal
relationship between these trends and Fisheries Department shortcomings.
86% (n=333) of respondents knew what the minimum mesh size for gill-nets was, and the majority were
aware of all of the main regulations in force in the Tanzanian sector of the lake (Table 2).
Table 2: Respondetits' efficacy ratings of selected fisheries regulations (Percentages provided are out of total
number of responses obtained pe! regulation: source: SEDAWOG, 2000a).
2 Water hyacinth invaded this lake via the Kagera River in the 1980s. It forms large, dense mats that cover inland
fishing areas and impedes access to landing sites. It has only recently been brought under control with the use of
introduced weevils that interfere with the plant's ability to breed.
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Regulation U;aw: Effective Useless Totals
Mesh-size controls 12 (4%) 295 (88%) 26 (8%) 333
Closed seasons 80 (24%) 231(69%) 23 (7%) 334
Poison ban 20 (6%) 307 (92%) 7 (2%) 334
Trawling ban 61(18%) 262 (79%) 9 (3%) 332
Minimum fish size 31(9%) 291 (87%) 11(4%) 333
Licensing 14 (4%) 308 (92%) 12 (4%) 334
Boat registration 18 (5%) 308 (92%) 8 (2%) 334
Closed areas 102(31%) 215 (64%) 16(5%) 333
-
- Resource coi Die& F10 sure Totals
There is less fish now than 5 yrs ago 280 (84%) 3 (13%) 9 (3%) 332
Fishing trips are longer now than 5 yrs. ago 268 (81%) 54(16%) 10 (3%) 332
There is less fish diversity now than 5 yrs. ago 271 (82%) 54(16%) 7 (2%) 332
There are more boats now than 5 yrs. ago 215 (65%) 104(31%) 13 (4%) 332
Average size of fish landed now smaller than 5 yrs. ago 179 (54%) 128 (38%) 26 (8%) 333
More illegal fishing techniques now than S yrs. ago 178 (54%) 128 (3 8%) 26 (8%) 332
Fishing pays less now than it did 5 yrs. ago 254 (77%) 67 (20%) 8(2%) 329
Typically, they considered these regulations to be effective. Again, this implies that respondents do not
necessarily see a causal relationship between the failure of Tanzania's fisheries regulations and a declining
resource base. There is, indeed, some doubt that the detrimental trends indicated in Table i are necessarily
viewed as serious problems. When asked what the single worst problem on the lake was, respondents were
divided, and there was no majority for any of the problems mentioned. Only 11% of respondents felt that
excessive effort was a problem, just 12% ranked declining catches as the main problem, while the largest
proportion of respondents (29%) rated illegal gear use as the worst problem on the lake.
How fishers view their resource base and, by extension, how they use it is, in many respects, determined by
the institutions in which they are a component. in the remainder of this paper, we consider Tanzaiia's Lake
Victoria fishery from the perspective of a series of criteria proposed by Ostrorn (1990), and consider the
ways in which these may help us to understand how this resource base is managed, and how these factors
impinge on the future success of the recently introduced BMUs.
The Ostrom criteria and their applicatìon to Tanzania's Lake Victoria fishery
The criteria identified by Ostrom (1990: 90; Dustin Becker and Ostrom, 1995) are as follows:
Clearly defined boundaries: individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units
from the Common Property Resource (CPR) must be clearly defmed, as must the boundaries of the
resource itself.
Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions: appropriation rules
restricting time, place, technology and/or quantity of resource units are related to local conditions iaúd
to provision rules requiring labour, material and/or money.
(e) Collective-choice arrangements: most of those affected by the rules of protection and harvesting are
included in the group that has the authority to alter these rules.
Monitoring: designated monitors who keep an eye on both what the physical system is up to as well as
its users, are, at least in part, accountable to the users of the CPR, or are the users themselves.
Graduated sanctions: those users that violate the rules will have sanctions imposed on them, that
graduate with the severity of the infringement, by either other users or else officials who are
accountable to the users.
Conflict-resolution mechanisms: users and their officials have rapid access to low-cost, local arenas to
resolve conflicts between users or between officials and users.
Minimal recognition of rights to organise: the rights of users to organise must be recognised by
central government, as well as the long-term rights of the users to the resource.
Nested enterprises: all activities associated with the regulation of the resource are nested in 'multi-
layered nested enterprises'. In other words, local institutions ought to be nested in a broader
framework of medium- and larger-scale institutions - such as Fisheries Departments - so that the
system as a whole can deal with both local problems as well as larger ones.
Each of the above are considered in turn.
Clearly defined boundaries
There is no wide-spread tradition in Tanzania for the demarcation of fishing areas associated with particular
groups of fishing communities; nor are there strong identifiable local institutions that control access or
exploitation strategies other than the Fisheries Department. it is apparent that community-based controls do
not exert a strong influence over the management of the fishery. In recent years, 'Beach Management Units'
(BMUs) have been established at Tanzanian Lake Victoria landing sites.
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These are staffed by beach committees elected from the local community, and have the express aim of
implementing aiid enforcing government fisheries regulations (1-loza and Mahatane, 1997). The Tanzanian
Fisheries i)epartrnent believes that this approach will lead to an appropriate government-local community
apparatus to enhance user-centred management.
Ostrorn (1990: 91), however, ilotes that "[sjo long as the boundaries of the resource and/or the specification
of individuals who can Lise the resource remain uncertain, no one knows what is being managed or for
whom" Ostrom, 1990: 9!). The absence of boundaries, furthermore, enables 'foreign' interests to exploit
tile fisheries resources and eventually pave way for exogenous control over the resource base (Pomeroy and
Berkes, 1997).
The use of boundaries in the formal management of Tanzania's Lake Victoria fisheries, however, is not
entirely new. Before the ban on commercial trawling in Tanzania, fisheries agencies identified areas for
trawling. This, to SOFIIC extent, lessened the conflict between artisanal fishers and commercial fishers over
gear entanglement. Negotiations were undertaken to plan a specific time for trawler departure so as to
minimise the potential for conflict, and allowed alternative marketing schedules to evolve. Here, artisanal
fishers, who were vulnerable and prone to fish spoilage, sold their catch early in the morning, while "ie
trawlers sold their catch in the evening. This arrangement helped, to some extent, to reduce many conflicts
that could have resulted in substantial losses to artisanal fishers.
Boundaries are also used elsewhere in Tanzania's fisheries legislation, which stipulate that 23 bays and
inlets are closed to fishing for half the year in order to protect spawning fish (United Republic of Tanzania,
1981). Fishing and farming communities feel that this period is too long, and not compatible with alternative
economic opportunities such as trading. During the closed season (January 1 ' to June 30th), farming
activities peak, trading activities are minimal because the farming harvest has yet to be reaped, and fishing is
the only dependable economic activity for immediate income generation. While our respondents rated the
efficacy of Tanzanian fisheries regulations fairly high, closed seasons and areas were considered the least
effective regulations (possibly because they are not applied uniformly across the fishery). 48% and 42% of
respondents respectively said that closed areas and seasons did not operate in their areas.
Following the ban on trawler fishing, conflicts remain, such as those between users of different gear types
(e.g. gill-nets and beach seines), and between artisanal fishers and those sponsored by industrial fish
processing factories. These areas of friction between user groups could provide a focus on which to build
boundary-based regulations. Another possible foundation for such types of regulation might be
nurseries. Wilson (1993) indicates that Tanzanian fishers, while keen to promote the notion that they would
never fish in a fish nursery, were often unable to identify where these were located. In this survey, fishers
were asked if there were places on the lake where they would not fish, and of the 190 who said there were,
48% identified fish nurseries, followed by 40% who identified closed areas (which were often regarded as
synonymous with fish breeding areas). The fact that fishers may well not know where such areas are located,
but still announce their reluctance to fish in them, may be an expression of their moral belief that such
places should not be fished, irrespective of whether or not they know where these are (Geheb and Crean,
2000). In view of this moral expression, the designation of areas as fish breeding areas may be a route by
which boundary-based regulations can be introduced into this fishery.
Tile political boundaries that currently exist in Tanzania are national boundaries traversing the lake,
regional, district, divisional, ward, village and village-cell boundaries. In many respects, respondents
interviewed for this survey did not view these boundaries as anything but administrative. 90% of
respondents said that they would fish in saine place as fishers from other communities (n=333); and 86%
said that the water adjacent to their communities belonged to the government, followed by 11% who said
that it belonged either to everyone or no one (n334). 97% said that anyone could fish the water adjacent to
their communities (ii334), while 80% said that their beaches were owned by the government (n=333).
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In sorne respects, these latter perspectives may have arisen because resources are regarded as shared, a
concept promulgated in Tanzania's 'ujar.naa' philosophies. 76% of our respondents felt that restricting the
number of fishers, boats and/or nets on the lake was not a viable way forward 'for fisheries rnanageiiìent
(n=333). Wilson etal. (1996: 13) suggest that this is because "[o)ue strong belief is that any Tanzanian has a
right to fish in Lake Victoria.. .This commitment to open access stems from their own desire to 'freely follow
the fish, prices, and security". Therefore, although fishers may agree that there is a relationship between
effort levels and catch declines, in their minds this is not sufficient grounds to establish boundaries that
restrict their movements nor effort levels (Geheb and Crean, 2000).
The ethnic groups that share Tanzania's Lake Victoria fishety vere not always unanimous when it caine to
territorial claims over water. The majority of Kuiya, Haya, Kerewe and Jita respondents interviewed 'felt that
their fishing communities should be allowed to claim water territories, while 48% of Sukuma respondents
did not agree that fishing communities should have this right. This may be because of the concentration of
fish processing factories in Sukurnadominated areas of the shoreline, and a reflection of Sukuma concerns
that communities holding rights over water might in some way hinder their fishing activities. 62% of
Sukuina respondents also disagreed that fishing communities should be allowed to determine who could or
could not fish, while Munyita, Karewe and Haya respondents, less affected by the Nile perch trade, agreed
that fishing communities should have this right.
This data, however, did indicate that in other ways, fishers do perceive that boundaries occur on Lake
Victoria. When asked what would happen if they fished in another community's waters without first
obtaining permission, 31% believed that they would be chased away, while 19% believed that they would be
seized and punished. Ari almost equal proportion (46%) said that nothing would happen (n333). When
questioned about future directions 'for management, just over half of our respondents said that they thought
that fishing communities should be allowed to claim water territories (57%; n333), and that fishing
communities should be allowed to say who could or could not fish (5 1%; n=333). Only 8% of respondents
said that au outsider would not need permission to fish 'from their landing sites.
These latter perspectives, along with the discussion on a reluctance to see regulations that limits effort or
movement, are not without recent controversy, however, regarding foreigners' being allowed to fish on the
lake. This worry has grown as a result o'f the view that the Nile perch fishery and its attendant wealth, in
some cases, denies local communities their equal share in the benefits. At many landing sites, Nile perch
filleting factories have established camps of fishers, for whom they pay license 'fees and provide gear. This
results in a skewed distribution of wealth at these landings that many of the original inhabitants resent. In
addition, outsiders arc often perceived as ruining local culture and values, and, typically, the use of illegal
fishing gear and poison is attributed only to outsiders (Medard, 1998). Conversely, however, Medard (1998)
reports that fishing communities may also welcome outsiders as sources of knowledge and experience from
beyond the community.
Ostrom's (1990) call for clearly defined boundaries containing clearly defined actors is ambiguous in the
case of Tanzania's Lake Victoria fisheries. The degree and desire for boundary applications appears to
depend ou social-political and economic variables, all of which contribute to multi-layered perspectives on
how boundaries should be applied and whom they should affèct (see Geheb and Crean, 2000).
There exists, nonetheless, a basis upon which boundary-based regulations may be applied to Tanzania's
Lake Victoria fisheries. These may be founded upon physical manifestations, such as fish nurseries, or on
social premises, such as fishers' prescriptions that permission must be sought before fishing from a beach, or
the desire to claim water territories. These directions must, however, also have definition based upon
membership and, indeed, the size of the groups to be involved.
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congruence between appropriation andpro vision rules and local conditions
Respondents interviewed for this survey were questioned about tile presence, at their landing sites, of fishing
rules that were designed by the community itself and not tile state. Respondents were allowed two answers,
and a total of 345 responses were generated (Table 3).
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Table 3: Presence of communi -develosed fishin rules ser lake-side district (Source: SEDAWOG, 2000a)
Just over half of those interviewed (53%) said that they had no rules oíthese varieties on their landing sites.
Such kinds of rules were least common in Bunda, Mwanza and Musoma Urban Districts, while they were
most common in Biharamulo, Misungwi and Geita Districts. Where these rules were said to exist, the largest
proportion were restrictions on fishing methods and/or gear. These were probably poison restrictions, given
that this survey occurred during a ban of fish exports which stemmed from concerns about incidences of fish
poisoning n the lake.
This 'patchy' distribution of community rules is indicative of the variety of cultural backgrounds in the
fisheiy, and probably also linked to whether or not the district is urban or rural in character. Other factors
such as the presence of Fisheries Department staff at the landing, and access to the landing, probably
determines whether or not such rules are present.
An additional, and important, factor that probably contributes to the presence or absence of community-
based rules at landing sites is the degree of government influence at the landing site. The assumption here is
that the greater the prevalence of state-based rules at the landing site, the less likely there will be community
derived rules. The history of 'ujanlaa' policies in Tanzania and their concomitant grouping of populations
into villages, and the presence of attendant government organisation at the lowest possible level, means that
Ward and Village Executive Officers exist at virtually every landing site in Tanzania. At the time of this
Survey, tile establishment of Beach Maiagernent Units (BMUs) at every Tanzanian landing site was not
complete. The latter follow the same format as other government instigated village-level organisation in
Tanzania in that there is the expectation that community members will enforce government legislation
Irrespective of whether or not these are congruent with conirn unity perceptions and ideas.
It is likely that this is the case at Tanzanian landing sites, and, if so, this might present a series of problems.
In Tanzania, those communities that are excessively reliant on fishing, with few alternative livelihood
24
Mv:aiza J
Iviv isungv'i 2 8 7
Geita 9 8
When to fisi M hods/ear Others No rules Totals
5 7
24
25
Sell' crema
Ma' u
Ukerewe
Bukoba Urban
Bukoba Rural
Mu leba
Biharamolo
sources, will be unlikely to diversi' into other livelihood sectors. Shortage of rains, persistent drought,
unpredictable markets for cash crops, such as coffee and cotton, have all served to attract people into the
fishery and not vice versa. The attraction of the fishery remains high, particularly given that domestic and
foreign markets for fish remain good. Household economies amongst the lake region's inhabitants have
escalating cash income demands, to pay for, amongst other expenses, school fees.
The needs and requirements of fishing communities, as defined by these kinds of environmental conditions,
are probably not congruent with state regulations that necessarily demand some measure of conservatiouism.
There are other ways in which the state rules diverge from local livelihood conditions. Restrictions setting
the minimum mesh-size for gill-nets at 127 mm, ensure that, at a stroke, fishers targeting Haplochromis
species are illegal fishers. Dagaa nets, in Tanzania's fisheries legislation, may not be smaller than 10 mm.
mesh-size. Fishers at Kibuyi beach, however, complain that this mesh-size is too large for dagaa. The fish
can either escape the net, or else they get stuck in it. Given that a haul of dagaa comprises several thousand
fish, removing each and every one of them is extremely tedious. Market conditions can also ensure that
fishers are criminalised: at Ihale Beach in Magu District, for example, fishers claimed that the trucks from
the fish filleting factories typically wanted Nile perch caught in nets of between 63 - 114 mm. (SEDA WOG,
2000b).
Therefore, rules restricting gear must also consider provisions for materials and money to enable fishers to
change to legally endorsed gear. If certain expensive gears are banned, and fishers are not adequately
compensated, then they will be unlikely to obey the regulations.
Co-management should be a middle course between state level concerns for the efficient and equitable
management of fisheries and local level concerns for self-governance, self-regulation and active
participation. (Pomeroy, 1998). Such systems need to be sufficiently dynamic if they are to cope with the
changing socio-economie environment which communities face. As Watson (1989: 55) comments,
"ejnvironmental and social problems may be created if the development of resource management systems
does not keep pace with environmental and economic conditions in less developed countries". As a resu4.t, a
degree of congruence between state managerial objectives and community livelihood objectives must exist,
if managerial institutions are to be established and maintained. The inclusion of communities of resource
users in the management of their resources may, to some extent, ameliorate the divergence of the state and
communities. The Tanzanian fisheries administration must begin to focus more explicitly on this transition
towards making resources-users partners in its agenda. This is not easy, as there are many who support a
centralised system of fisheries administration, and find demands for partnerships with fishing communities a
threat to this power base.
CoJJctive choice airangements
Fisheries managers increasingly recognise that a fishery cannot be managed effectively without the co-
operation and participation of fishers to make laws and regulations work (Geheb 1999; ikiara, 1999;
Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Wilson and Medard, 1998). Co-managenient systems have emerged as a
partnership arrangement using the capacities and interests of local fishers and communities, complemented
by the ability of the government to provide enabling legIslation, enforcement and conflict resolution and
other assistance.
Ostrom (1990) reasons that insofar as community participation in these types of arrangements are
concerned, it is necessary that that those affected by resource management rules are amongst those who have
the power to alter these same rules. Of necessity, this section overlaps with the previous one in many
respects, and it is sufficient here to say that Tanzanian fishing communities hold no jurisdiction over
fisheries legislation beyond that granted them by the BMU system. Nor do they have the right to change it.
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In some respects, however, Tanzanian fishing communitIes may not be ready for such radical changes to the
structure of fisheries legislation. Table 4 summarises responses to six questions posed on scenarios that may
be suitable avenues for regulatory change. Those that involve the state typically obtain strong support, such
as having Fisheries Department personnel stationed on every beach, or having the government take fishing
regulations more seriously. Those suggestions which involve greater community participation are treated
cautiously, such as communities being allowed to say who can and who cannot fish, or being allowed to
claim water territories.
The government and the fishing communities should take
the regulations more seriously
No more flshers/boais/nets should be allowed on the lal:e
Fishin mmunities should be allowed to say who can or
cannot fish
Fishing communities should be allowed to claim water
territories
Fishing communities should be allowed to punish
offenders
Fisheries Department personnel should be stationed on
each and every beach
Table 4: Respondent's reactions to .ro,osed manaoerial directions (Source: SEDAWOG, 2000a).
Interestingly, th suggestion that communities should be allowed to punish offenders recei.r::dl considerable
support, possibly because of communities' experience with 'sungusungu' vigilante groups lî.ve powers
of arrest and punishment. These findings would appear to support those of Wilson et al's (1 99: 567) who
comment that, in Tanzania, "[formal ;tate participation is seen as necessaiy for any fisheries management
even at the most local level".
There is little doubt that Nile perch filleting factories in Tanzania enjoy a good relationship with the state.
Their powerful producer's organisation is well placed to negotiate for favourable treatment from the state
and, as Medard (2000) noted, fishers dealing with species other than the Nile perch blame the government
for favouring Nile perch fishers t the behest of the filleting factories which, they say, can override the state.
The Nile perch filleting factories, therefore, are critically placed at the junction between the state's demands
for foreign exchange earnings and the sustainability of Lake Victoria's Nile perch stocks. While fishing
communities on the lake may well envy this pivotal role within the fishery, and lament their inability to plan
for long-term futures, there is a need for caution. It is by no means clear that a strong bargaining position vis
a vis the state will necessarily result in a sustainable outcome. As mentioned earlier, many of the factories in
Tanzania serve clients who demand fish captured in nets below the 127 mm. minimum gill-net mesh-size.
For management partnerships to be viable managerial tools for the lake, it is necessary that the state's iole
include that of moderation, minimising the excesses of both industrial and artisanal fishers fof the sake of
the sustained productivity of the lake.
There is nothing 'collective' about present managerial structures in Tanzania. At the same time, however, it
must be borne in mind that Tanzanian fishing communities view the state as an integral component in
fisheries management. Data reported above. and elsewhere in this paper, suggets that fishing communities
do not have, at present, any desire to embark upon the management of their fisheries by themselves. This
very characteristic should provide a fruitful basis upon which co-management can be established. In some
respects, the discussion in this section indicates that the role of the state within co-management cou 1cl be
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defined as a moderating influence, ensuring that there is a balance between the most liberal of community
livelihood demands and the most conservative of fisheries management objectives.
Monitoring
67% of respondents interviewed for this study claimed that they knew everyone in their home villages by
sight (n=333). In Biharamulo, Ukerewe and Tarime, the majority of respondents denied that this was the
case. 63% of respondents said that when they went fishing, it was always with the same fishers (n=333). The
places Tanzanian Lake Victoria fishers fish are typically shared: 91% of respondents said that they will fish
in areas alongside fishers from other communities. Whether the latter are known or not is unknown.
The above results suggest that there is often a sufficiently high degree of familiarity between fishers, high
enough that the presence of outsiders can be noted, as could the infringement of fishing regulations. As
indicated above, however, the question of whether or not fishers are prepared to accept the task of
monitoring is by no means clear.
Respondents were asked to whom they would first complain in the event that they had a fisheries-related
problem. The largest proportion (4 1%) said that they would first complain to the Fisheries Department
representative, followed by 27% who would complain to their beach leaders (n=333). Fishers were then
asked: if one 'fisher were to accuse another of stealing nets, who would solve the conflict? 35% said that a
government representative (including the Fisheries Department) would solve it, followed by 34% who
thought the police could deal with it (n=334). In the event that one community were to accuse another of
stealing its nets, 45% said that the police would be looked to provide a solution, followed by 32% who said
that government help would be sought (n=334).
The above data suggests, again, a certain reticence amongst respondents for assuming, wholesale, conflict
resolution responsibilities, and, by extension, monitoring responsibilities. It is possible that respondents dici
not see any real distinction between the state and their communities, and therefore they feel that talking
about state responsibilities does not contradict talking about community-level responsibility. With
government representatives present at local levels, social and administrative intercourse occurs at a similarly
intimate level. The presence of Village Executive Officers and the recently formed Beach Management
Units (BMUs) at Tanzanian landing sites also implies that that which is observed and monitored by the
village is also monitored by the state.
Because the line between the community and the state is blurred, it is difficult to differentiate
responsibilities between either. One may expect that notions of the community assuming state monitoring
responsibilities may be greeted with some confusion by Tanzanian fishing communities, who believe that
they already perform this role.
The intimacy that Tanzanian fishers share with their resource base and their own communities suggests a
basis upon which a monitoring system can be implemented. Fishers know of new arrivals to their
communities, about others who pass through the waters that they fish, and of variations within the resource
base which may compel them to migrate. This body of knowledge could imply that there is every reason to
expect the BMU system to work, given its emphasis on monitoring the activities of fishers, which the BMUs
are supposed to log (Hoza and Mahatane, 1998). Like much political power, that wielded by the BMUs is
discretionary. As we shall argue below, many of the externally sourced administration systems introduced to
communities in Tanzania become socialised, and probably deviate from the objectives they were intended.
The BMUs will be subject to the normal stresses and strains that any administrative system within a tight
knit community may be subjected to, such as requests 'for leniency, patronage relationships between fishers
and boat or gear owners, and the social network that defines social relationships and the acceptable extent of
administrative action. Herein lies the potential for the BMUs to fail, for while they may well be successful in
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the sense that they become socialised and accepted by fishing communities they may weil end up serving
community livelihood objectives, paying lip service to the Fisheries Department as need be, and deviating
away from fisheries nianagement objectives.
Graduated sanctions
Environmental problems cannot be solved through co-operation if the coercive power inherent in the co-
operative pact is overwhelming (Ostrom, 1990). In such a situation, voluntary compiiance is non-existent. In
Tanzania, the government, through the Fisheries Department, assumes monitoring and sanctioning
responsibilities over fishing activities. So far, the activities of Beach Management Units (BMUs) are
directed by the Fisheries Department and do not reflect local conditions. Anything to do with the possession
of under-sized mesh nets, beach seines, and other illegal fishing gear is normally referred to the Fisheries
Department. The curbing of fishing with poisons, maintaining hygiene for fish quality control, supervising
the use of legal gear, and the control of fishing in fish breeding grounds, are all aclivities undertaken by the
BIv[Us in their capacity as representatives of the Fisheries Department (SEDAWOG, 2000b).
During a recent study at Ihale, when asked about local institutions and responsibilities, the BMÌJ explained
that the main way of enforcing compliance at this landing was through the imposition of fines. Fines are not
levied against those that surrender their illegal gear voluntarily (SEDA WOG, 2000b). Presumably such fines
are graduated, with minor ofi'ences being minimally fined, and graver offences being heavily fined or
referred to authorities beyond Ihale.
At Shadi village, a Sukuma community, extreme offences, such as the use of fish poison, result in offenders
being socially excommunicated by the communities (Medard, 2000). Following discovery of the offence,
the village Chairman calls a village meeting and announces the name of offender and the offence, This
action is known askuturiJiwa'. After being condemned, the offender can no longer speak with villagers, nor
look to borrow matches, salt or sugar from neighbours. The offender can no longer shop from village stores,
nor use village facilities such as the health clinic. If there is a burial at the offender's home, the village will
gather to witness the burial itself, but will not stay to mourn, and will make no contributions towards funeral
expenses, as is common. If the offender dies, s/he will not be mourned by the village, this being left to
his/her relatives (Medard, 2000).
At another village, Chimfufu, elders explained that this type of 'excommunication' from the village is the
most drastic form of punishment that can be brought to bear on an offender (Medard, 2000). In Chimfufu, it
was explained, offenders are liable to receive such a punishment, but, depending on the severity of the
offence, the offender can seek a re-trial. A village meeting will then be announced, and the village will
dictate to hirn/her a fine that must be paid. The fine is largely symblt of the offender's reconciliation with
the community and a public admission by the offender that a wrong has been committed. The fine is paid to
the 'mtemï, the chairperson of a village vigilante group, the 'sungusungu', which will be explored further
below.
The above type of 'informally' imposed sanctions will vary in format and from community to community.
They are typically pliable and capable of changing to match the severity and frequency of offences. The
degree to which such styles of sanctioning are applied will depend on the strength and policies of the village
leadership. In some cases, village leaders relax this style of sanctioning, preferring to refer offences to
government courts of law. Elders at Chimfufu noted that as village members interacted more and more with
outsiders, their own internal systems ofjustice have become weakened and criticised for not recogilising the
authority of government sanctioning systems (Medard, 2000).
As the BMUs become established within Tanzanian fishing communities, the fishing regulations of the state
have assumed a considerable presence at landing sites. The extent to which these are actually rigidly
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interpreted and applied is, however, uncertain. As argued earlier, it is probable that as these rules become
absorbed into fishing communities and, in effect, socialised, each offence will be judged along the lines of
community perceptions of right and wrong, and sanctions graduated accordingly. These rules will, needless
to say, be judged with similar criteria, and their efficacy will become dependent on this judgernent.
Conflict resolution mechanisms
Above, we presented data on to whom fishers would complain given certain problems. To recap: in the
event of a fisheries-related problem, 41 % said that they would first complain to the Fisheries Department
representative, followed by 27% who would complain to their beach leaders. If one fisher were to accuse
another of stealing his/her nets, 35% respondents said that a government representative (including the
Fisheries Department) would solve the dispute, followed by 34% who thought the police could deal with it
(n=334). In the event that one community were to accuse another of stealing its nets, 45% said that the
police would be looked to provide a solution, followed by 32% who said that government help would be
sought (n=334) (Table 5).
Table 5: Individuals or institutions to whom respondents will first complain given certain problem scenarios
-
(Source: SEDAWOG, 2000a).
These data suggest that official, government-sanctioned solutions to conflict resolution are popular amongst
Lake Victoria's fishers. Other possible solutions are intra-community meetings, beach leaders or recOurse to
elders. This implies that, to some extent, fishing communities have community-based mechanisms of
conflict resolution just like they have for other social problems. Where communities seek outside solutions
to conflict problems will depend on, firstly, the sense that they should seek external solution; and secondly,
on whether or not community-level institutions exist that are capable of providing such solution. The results
in Table 5 suggest that, in most cases, the external option is favoured. It must also be remembered that, in
many cases, Tanzanian fishing communities feel government administration is, in any case, internal. How
these views will change fol1owng the imposition ot BMUs on fishing coinmunifles, iemains to be seen
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Sourc ,! r
Ifyou had pro blenis in the lisliejy, to whom would you complain flït?
Fellow fishers 26 (8%)
Fisheries Dept. representative 136 (41%)
Beach leader 90 (27%)
Other 79 (24%)
331
If one usher were to accuse another ofstealing his/her nets, how would the problem be solved?
They sort it out between themselves 22 (7%)
Community elders/meeting 42 (13%)
Police 115 (34%)
Government representative 117 (35%)
Other 36(11%)
Total 332
Ifan other community were to accuse yours ofstealing its nets, how would the problem be solved?
Community leaders meet 53(16%)
Government help sought 108(33%)
Police help sought 152 (46%)
Other 17 (5%)
Total
-.
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Miti: ccogiiitior
If ft T of appropriators to t'eir own institutions are not to be challenged by external
governntaJ ai :c«ies, hn cc ìnuniies musi be encouraged to define their members' relationship to
thii' resOurces (Qsan. This 'T'il cliapend, howeve', on whether the fishing communities value their
resources and serkusy crJiisre' lioi ianes within Ii afTccc their lives. To begin with, flshingcommunities
ILlUSI hPX a iom oc etinS io discuss pí'oleiìls mid solutions themseles. This will
enable diem to iic oi ho'' la pixred and. fionily, to develop organisations and insLituional arrangements
(ui'hís and rules) fc is nient.
Public forums must be freed of heavy government presence. Fishers must not feel threatened if tiley
criticise existing a 'e. cni;Tt. 111Iìsenieni methods, and they must be listened to by both
communiL" ¡ïien±e ia a: OiIiS. This will lead to hie decentralisation of governmenL sperations,
v,ï ich may re1í e de 1io'ieid ci jJOVTCi crisi resources io íhe communiiy, hence enhancing community
and economic deve1op::. u many cases, fishers devise their own n4jes without creating. formal
governmental jurisdirifon foi his tuï'oe. For example 51% of fishers interviewed for this study felt that
fishing comimunides should b° alIo::ec io determine who could or could not fish, and 91% of respondents
thought that fishing communities should have ihe right io punish offenders (Table 4). The advancement of
such objectives requires an organiaaiional framework, vvhich will need the willingness of the state to enable
it, and the desire of the communities to carry it through.
The Tanzanian state h: in the past, recognised the right of communities to establish their own
arrangements for crime :cioiì and punishment. 'Sungusungu' vigilante groups developed amongst
Sukuma and Nyamvìeii poiulaíiom in 1981, ostensibly Lo counter government failure to stern widespread
cattle rusiling in de regioa (Bukurara, 1991). Their development, Abrahams (1989: 367) comments, was
"...an inclicaimon that people were not satisfied with fundamental aspects of the supply side of their
relationship with the state". Their roles are to "...hear and determine disputes, impose traditional fines
known as nws'anwle, and coctrol funds arising from these fines. It can safely be said that the committee
makes substauiJ deiso;is abcL3i :T'iiai action should or should not be taken, and when and how it is taken"
(Bukara, 1991: 260). These groups have since been legally endorsed by the state.
In becoming legitimately sanctioned by the state, sungustingu have become accountable to the state and not,
necessarily, to the Sukuma nor the Nyawezi. Reported harassment, torture and murder by sungusungu
groups (Abrahams, 1989; AfricaNews, 1997) may, in fact, be indicative of the shift from local control to
national control. Lying within the realm of under-regulated government control, local controls no longer
provide a counterbalance to sungusungu excesses.
An additional point of concern is one raised in the introduction. The Tanzanian government can now state
that fishing communities exercise local rights to organisation through their implementation of Tanzania's
national fisheries legislation. Onyango (2000), however, makes the point that while Ihis means communities
may well own regulatory implementation, they have nü ownership and no say - in what it is that they are
implementing. In this way, whai mighi be perfectly good local alternatives to state originated regulations
become criminahised while, at ihe same time, a lack of community belief in the state's regulations may
render them, at the local leve,
If this imbalance is to be addressed, then new laws and policies may needto be developed and/or existing
laws and policies amended or reinterpreted to authorise and legitirnise these functions of co-management.
Issues of co-ordination, communication between the various stakeholders and roles must be addressed. In
addition, a comprehensive national environmental assessment document must be in place to enhance the
recognition of the indigenous kuci:*e for the betterment of fisheries management.
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A series of enabling management legislation iii support of decentralisation was passed in 1970s and 1981)s.
This enabled Tanzania to experience self-reliance and local democracy but did not live up to its potential
(Chambers, 1985, quoted in Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997:477). In some cases, however, Tanzania has had a
successful history in providing enabling legislation to authorise and legitimise rights to organise and to make
and enforce institutional arrangements at the local level. One example has been the creation of co-
management strategies for the Mafia Island Marine Park, which enables districts and villages to manage
their own affairs.
Insofar as Lake Victoria is concerned, enabling legislation allowing communities the right to organise does
not exist. Fishing communities may, however, feel that the government structures that presently exist are an
adequate basis for them to organise themselves around. In the purest sense of the term, therefore, the right to
'organise' independently of the state may well not exist in Tanzania's Lake Victoria fishery, but the right to
'bend' externally source administrative structures to suit local livelihood demands does, at least informally.
Nested enterprises
The 'nesting' of community-level organisations within a wider district, legion and lake-wide framework is
crucial for the success of institutions at the local level. There are various actors in the fisheries sector and
yet, in sorne cases, they operate independently though they may have the same goals. The establishment of
rules and by-laws at one level without corresponding action at other levels will produce an incomplete
system of adinin istration that may not endure in the long run. Nesting also enables interrelated activities and
interests to be linked so as to achieve different goals at a wider scale with minimum resources. For example,
in the Nile river system, "... sorne of the environmental externalities associated with water and soil
management.. .can be accommodated at the level of the micro-watershed; others can only be accommodated
through the co-ordinated efforts of nation states" (Swallow 1997: 23). What 'nesting' implies is that local
level management institutions have a place within a far broader management structure that encompasses
Lake Victoria at the regional level. 1f co-management is to succeed on this lake, it is necessary that the
relationship between the landing site und the nation state is eleai-ly defined and it is understood that each
extreme is mutually interdependent.
As has been argued above, BMUs are nested within Village Government, which in turn are nested within
ward, district, regional and finally, national administration. This should ensure that that problems of varying
degrees of scope and scale can be dealt with at commensurate levels of administration. What is of concern,
however, is that this is a spectacularly vertical administration, wìth very little room for horizontal linkages
with other informal activities at various levels. Co-management necessarily implies that hierarchies are
sufficiently pliable to embrace organisations and institutions that may, on the surface, appear to lie beyond
conventional administrative order (Noble, 2000). In addition, although the creation of BM1Js may well have
decentralised the administration of Tanzania's Lake Victoria fishery, they have not resulted in any kind of
delegation of decision-making powers nor, for that matter, the right to formulate, implement and enforce
community level regulations (Noble, 2000). What this means is that BMUs are only really accountable to
the Fisheries Department, and not necessarily subject to the scrutiny and censure of their own communities.
This is a problem in so far as nesting is concerned, for it directly impinges on the efficacy and success of
fisheries management regulations at the local level.
Conclusions: socio-political economy and its influence on management of Lake Victoria' s
resources
The findings of this paper, as they relate to Ostrorn's (1990) criteria for institutional robustness, may be
summarised as follows:
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Clearly defined boundaries: there exist state-based boundaries (closed areas) lo control fishing, and
community upheld varieties, such as the need to seek permission before one can fish from a landing
site. There is limited support for the idea that fish breeding areas should be closed to fishing and that
fishing communities should have the right to say who can or cannot fish.
Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions: we found no grounds for
supposing that state rules were congruent with community perceptions nor the conditions in which
they operate.
Collective-choice arrangements: the regulation of the fishery is not collective, but we find that fishers
are cautious about the possibility of assuming too many managerial responsibilities.
Monitoring; the familiarity that fishers share with one another in iheir communities and those with
whom they fish is a basis for monitoring.
Graduated sanctions: communities typically have a sense that, as the gravity of an offence increa"s,
so does the severity of the punishiiients. There exist both internai and external punìshment systems to
deal with offences, arid in some cases, these appear to clash.
Conflict-resolution iiiechuisms: fishers typically seek recourse to external agencies to resolve their
conflicts.
Minimal recognition of rights to organise: while fishers may have the right to organise, their
organisation has rio legally endorsed bearing oit the fishery and ils management.
Nested enterprises: local level state administration is well nested within a hierarchy that reaches out to
the national level. This arrangement has very little scope for horizontal organisation.
The founding father of Tanza'iian, the late Mwaliniu Julius Nyerere, has had a profound influence on the
socio-politica! economy of Tanzania. 1-Jis Ujnaa' iolicy of 'self-governance and self-reliance', sought to
enable the communities share what resources they had and to plan for their sustainable use. lii the
implementation of this vision, however, rural Tanzanian communities were perhaps not prepared for the
responsibilities they were expected to assume. As a result, the government at the top ended up wielding too
rnuLh power, and the communities ended up obeying vai ions resolutions from the top
Despite this skewed distribution of power, the face-to-face community interaction that aroc thro
Ujamaa settlement schcmes was the stepping stone towards the development o-f strong - if government
defined - community-level institutions. The U/rnaa policy encouraged people to stay together and utilise
available res'urces jointly. Village resources, such as cash crop farms, vere owned jointly. Co-operative
societies from the village to the regional level were formed to boost the Tanzanian economy through the
same spirit The marketing distribution and piofits accrued from jointly owned iesources were also meant to
sei-ve the interests and pwposes of Lhe majority tri the villages Specified village Committees were set up to
enhance decision-making For the purposes of this discussion, the most important outcome of the Ujainaa
policy was the manner in which it generated a sense of collective awareness, and, importantly, a sense of
trust amongst villagers for the state.
In the discussion above, we have described how the influence of the state exists at the local level in the form
of Village Committees and, ¡n the case of fisheries management, Beach Management Units (BMUs). It is
our contention that these government structures, manned by elected representatives from the villages, have
become 'sociahised' into daily patterns of community life. As such, it seems probable that the outcome of
these administrative structures is the product of' negotiation between those staffing the village administration
and the communities from which they are drawn.
The implications of this are important in two ways: firstly, that the sanie administrative structures will vary
from place to place, depending on culture, history and economy; and secondly, these structures may reflect
very well the wants and desires of the communities of which they ar-e a part, and cope well with
heterogeneity, but may fail to converge with management objectives. Externally introduced regulations, in
other words, become subject to village institutions in sudi a way that they come to mirror community
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objectives that may not replicate those they were initially intended to achieve. This is all the more likely
given that these institutions are externally designed and implemented, without any kind of village-level
inputs to their designs. It is unlikely that such regulations will have legitimacy in the eyes of local-level
resource users (Jentoft, 1989).
Tanzania's Lake Victoria fisheries management system is of considerable interest because the relationship
between fishers and the state is good. This may, however, be because of the limited interference by the state
in community affairs: there exists no point at which poor relationships can occur. Above, we commented on
the transfer of monitoring of swigusungu away from the local community to the state. In the absence of
government resources and staff, this transfer is tantamount to no scrutiny at all, leaving room for the
considerable abuse of powers by some sungusungu groups.
Today, the government and intergovernmental organisations are trying to come to terms with modern
democratic principles, such as co-management and community participation, where power is supposed to
rest with resource users. Fishers themselves prefer government agencies in enforcement, but it is not going
to be long before the apparent weakness in a strictly centralised system are realised by the fishers and
fishing communities as a whole.
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